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UNION LEAGUE CLUB V. JOHNSON.

[18 C. (2d)

(Ada County v. Boise CO'mmercial Club, 20 Ida. 421 [118
Pac. 1086, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 101]), and the club admits
that it is a "person" as defined by the act. But it insists
that the statute applies only to those engaged in business
for profit because the taxable activity was required to be
"with the object of gain, benefit or advantage, either direct
or indirect." As its purpose is not to make a profit but to
serve its members, it argues, the judgment should be affirmed.
It is significant that the statute does not include the word
"profit" in its definitions but imposed a tax upon the transactions of one conducting business "with the object of gain,
benefit or advantage, either direct or indirect." Assuming
that no profit was either intended or realized by the club from
the operations of its dining rooms and bar, it does not follow
that there was no "gain, benefit or advap.tage. " Few persons
would go to a club without these facilities and they undoubtedly largely contribute to the success of such an enterprise.
In construing a statute using the identical language of our
own, the Supreme Court of Ohio aptly remarked: " 'Profit'
may be said to be 'gain, benefit, or advantage,' but 'gain,
benefit, or advantage' does not necessarily mean only' profit'."
(State v. Zellner, 133 Ohio St. 263 [13 N. E. (2d) 235].)
The respondent relies upon Cuzner v. California Club, 155
Cal. 303 [100 Pac. 868, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1095], and Varcoe
v. Alameda Lodge, 174 Cal. 549 [163 Pac. 909], in support of
his position but these decisions are not determinative of the
question. In the Cuzner case the court held that a bona fide
social club selling liquor only to members was not subject to
an ordinance requiring those engaged in that business to obtain a license. But the ordinance did not define the word
"business," and the court pointed out that this term "as
used in a law imposing a license-tax on businesses, trades, professions, and callings, ordinarily means a business in the trade
or commercial sense, one carried on with a view to profit or
livelihood. ' , The later decision was placed upon the same
ground.
As against these contentions, the respondent takes the position that because the legislature in 1939 expressly. amended
the statute to impose a tax upon social clubs, this court should
construe the former law as not including them. [2] This
statement is based upon the general rule that courts ordinarily assume from a new enactment, a legislative purpose to
change the existing law. (People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116
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[255 Pac. 792,52 A. L. R. 811] ; Loew's Inc. v. Byram, 11 Cal.
(2d) 746 [82 Pac. (2d) 1] .) [lb] But in view of the fact
that at the time this amendment was made, social clubs were
resisting the eollection of sales taxes, a legislative intent to
clarify rather than to change the law, may well be inferred.
The judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment
for the appellant.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., CUrtis, J., Carter, J., and Spence,
J., pro tern., concurred.
Respondent '8 petition for a rehearing was denied August
21, 1941. Traynor, J., did not participate therein.

[L. A. No. 17800. In Bank.-July 24, 1941.]

. RICHARD GARVEY, J r.,et aI., Petitioners, v. H. L.
BYRAM, as Tax Collector, etc., Respondent.
[1] Taxation-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Sale by State-Purchasers-Who may Purchase-Owner.~Although Pol. Code,
§ 3834.25, relating to the sale of property sold to the state
for delinquent taxes, does not specifically so provide, an
owner of property when the tax lien attached and when it
was deeded to the state may not purchase it at the tax sale,
even though he is the highest bidder. Any payment he may
make is but a mode of payment of the taxes. A contrary
rule would permit evasion of the conditions' of redemption
specified in Pol. Code, § 3817, and, contrary to settled policy,
enable him to secure the property free and clear of private encumbrance under Pol. Code, § 3836.1.
[2] Statutes - Oonstruction and Interpretation - PresumptionsLegislative Intent-Omission of Reference to Settled Policy.
When a rule is long engrained in the public policy of the state
it must be presumed that the legislature took it for granted
rather than sought to alter it in omitting any specific provision for its application. Thus, the failure of the legislature
to provide in Pol. Code, § 3834.25, that bids are subject to the

1. See 24 Oal. Jur. 358; 26 R. O. L. 412.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Taxation, § 322; 2. Statutes, § 183.
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general rule as to the purchase by an owner of his own property at a tax sale must be construed not as a rejection but as
a tacit acceptance of the rule.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the execution of
a tax deed. Writ denied.
Richard Garvey, Jr., in pro. per., J. H. 0 'Connor, County
Counsel, S. V. O. Prichard, Assistant County Counsel, and
. A. Curtis Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioners.
Landels, Weigel & Crocker and Walter S. Home for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioners have' instituted this proceeding in mandamus to compel the respondent, the tax collector
of Los Angeles County, to execute a deed to petitioner Garvey
pursuant to a public tax sale of certain real· property. Respondent has generally demurred.
Garvey was the owner of the property in question when the
tax lien attached and when the property was deeded to the
state for unpaid taxes. Pursuant to the procedure prescribed
in Political Code, sections 3834.20 to 3834.25, a public sale
was held on April 11, 1940, at which petitioner Garvey made
the .highest bid. He bid less than the amount of the taxes
that were delinquent when the property was deeded to the
state,· exclusive of penalties, interest and costs, but not less
than the minimum price specified in the resolution of the
board of supervisors approving the sale. Respondent, H. L.
Byram, as Tax Collector of Los Angeles County refuses to
issue a deed to Garvey on the grounds that Political Code,
section 3834.25 (added by Stats. of 1939, ch. 529, sec. 2),
does not contemplate a sale to the delinquent owner of the
. property for an amoun~ less than the accumulated unpaid
taxes, and that it could not be so construed without violating
article XIII, section 1 of the California Constitution requiring all property in the, state to be taxed in proportion to its
value, and article IV, section 31, prohibiti:qg the legislature
from making or authorizing the making of any gift oI,any
public money or thing of value to any individual.
Political Code section 3834.25 provides: "If the property
is not redeemed before the sale, the tax collector shall sell
the property at public auction to the highest bidder at the
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time and place fixed in the notice of intended sale; but no bid
shall be accepted for a sum less than the minimum price
fixed in the resolution of the board of supervisors." The section contains no specific exclusion of bids by the former owner
of the property.
[1] Such an omission, however; cannot be interpreted as
an authorization of such bids in view of the long established
rule in this state that an owner who has held title throughout
the period of tax delinquency cannot be a vendee at the tax
sale. Whatever payment he makes to the tax collector in the
course of a purported sale under such circumstances must
be regarded as a payment of taxes and cannot serve to
effectuate an actual sale that would convey to him title to
the property. (Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal. 38 [85 Am. Dec. 94] ;
McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 300; Ooppinger v. Rice, 33 Cal.
408; Bernal v. Lynch, 36 Cal. 135; Barrett v. A.merein, 36
Cal. 322; Garwood v. Hastings, 38 Cal. 216; Reily v. Lan,.
caster, 39 Cal. 354; Ohristy v. l?isher, 58 Cal. 256; Barnard
v. Wilson, 74 Cal. 512 [16 Pac. 307] ; Emeric v. Alvarado, 90
Cal. 444 [27 Pac. 356] ; Gates v. Lindley, 104 Cal. 451 [38
Pac. 311].)
"It is well settled that one who is under a moral or legal
obligation to pay the taxes is· not in a position to become a
purchaser at a sale made for such taxes. If such person
permits the property to be sold for taxes, and buys it in,
either in person or indirectly through the agency of another,
he does not thereby acquire any right or title to the property, but his purchase is deemed one mode of paying the
taxes. " (Ohristy v. Fisher, 58 Cal. 256, 258; see, also, Black
on Tax Titles, Second Edition, sections 273-274; Blackwell on
Tax Titles, Fourth Edition, pages 443, 444.)
[2] When a rule is so long engrained in the public policy of
the state it must be presumed that the legislature took it for
granted rather than sought to alter it in omitting any specific
provision for its application. Thus, in the present situation '
the failure of the legislature to provide that bids are subject
to the rule must be construed not as a rejection but as a
tacit acceptance of the rule.
If a defaulting owner were allowed in effect to redeem his
property through the simple device of SUbmitting the highest
bid at a tax sale, he could evade the conditions of redemption
set forth in section 3817 of the Political Code, namely, the
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payment, before the state shall have disposed of the- property, of "the amount of taxes, penalties for delinquency, and
costs due thereon at the time of such sale, and also all taxes
that were a lien upon said real property at the time said
taxes became delinquent; and also all unpaid taxes of every
description which are a lien against the property, for each
year since the sale, as shown on the delinquent assessment
rolls. . . . " It is significant that Political Code, section
3817, was reenacted with minor amendments during the same
legislative session in which Political Cod€, section 3834.25,
was enacted and it is not plausible that the absence of a
specific provision in the second should serve to destroy the
effectiveness of the specific provisions in the first.
Political Code, section 3897, originally provided that bids
had to equal at least twice the taxes plus interest, costs, and
expenses. (Amendments to the Codes, 1873-74, p. 153.)
When the legislature, commencing in 1905 (Stats. and Amend.
1905, pp. 31, 32; Stats. 1933, p. 2586; Stats. 1935,p. 1437;
Stats. 1939, ch. 529, sec. 2), allowed lower minimum bids, it
did not thereby enable defaulting owners to make such bids.
Legislation that is concerned only with allowing a greater
latitude in fixing the amount of the minimum bid cannot be
construed to enlarge the field of bidders.
Petitioners seek to distinguish the cases cited above on the
ground that they prev~nt a defaulting owner, not from becoming a vendee at a tax sale, but only from improving his
title thereby through the elimination of other private interests. They advance the view that if his title is subsequently
questioned by a private encumbrancer, the court should hold
that the purchase "is in effect only a redemption." Such a
view, however, is at variance not only with Political Code,
section 3817, which sets forth the conditions of red€mption,
but with Political Code, section 3836.1, which provides that
the tax collector's deed shall vest title in the grantee "free
and clear of all encumbrances of any kind existing before
the sale" except liens for future instalments of assessments,
direct assessments, and taxes of a non-consenting tax agency.
Faced with this clear statutory provision, petitioners maintain
that should the defaulting owner become a grantee, principles
of equity should prevail over the statutory provision to preclude his receiving a clear title. The court would thus be
required not only to circumscribe the rule of the cases cited,

but to run counter to express statutory provisions in order to
formulate a policy, which finds no express legislative sanction, that defaulting owners may bid at tax sales. It is for
the legislature and not the courts to formulate such a policy.
The petition for a peremptory writ of mandate is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and
Pullen, J., pro tem., concurred.
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent.
I do not agree with the conclusion reached in the majority
opinion or the reasons upon which it is based. I am convinced that the majority opinion entirely misconceives the
purpose of the legislature in the enactment of sections 3834.20
to 3834.25 of the Political Code, and overlooks the serious
consequences which will flow from the rule laid down therein.
Abstractly stated, the majority opinion purports to hold that
a person holding the record title to real property which has
been assessed and the taxes permitted to go delinquent and
the property sold to the state for delinquent taxes, cannot
purchase said property from the state at delinquent tax sale
even though he is the highest bidder· at such sale. No legisla-:tive declaration is relied upon for this holding. On the contrary it is conceded that the statutes of this state create no
prohibition whatever against a former owner becoming a
purchaser of property at delinquent tax sale from the state
under any circumstances.
The principal reason for the conclusion reached in the
majority opinion is stated therein as follows:
"If a defaulting owner were allowed in effect to redeem his
property through the simple device of submitting the highest
bid at the tax sale, he could evade the conditions of redemption set forth in section 3817 of the Political Code. . . . "
That this reason is unsound and not a just or reasonable
basis for discriminating against the owner of tax delinquent
property in favor ofa stranger to the title thereto, is to my
mind obvious.
The majority opinion does not indicate the extent to which
the prohibition against an owner of property to bid for the
purchase of same at a tax sale may go; that is, whether such
prohibition extends to all persons' interested in the property
or. only to an owner in severalty who. held the title thereto in
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fee simple and to whom the property was assessed at the
time of the tax' delinquency. What the situation will be with
reference to the owners of various interests in such property
is not indicated. In other words, is a remainderman who is
entitled to the fee after the termination of a life estate within
the prohibited class? Is a conditional vendee under a contract of sale likewise within the prohibited class Y Is a mortgagee or beneficiary under a trust deed covering the property
in such prohibited class Y Are the heirs or legal representatives of a deceased property owner in such prohibited class Y
Are trustees to whom property has been conveyed in trust
in such prohibited class? Is the owner of property which
has been erroneously assessed to another person in such
prohibited class 1 Are persons entitled to future or conditional estates or interests in real property in such prohibited
class T All of these and many other questions may arise to
plague property owners and officials administering the tax
laws as the result of the conclusion reached in the majority
opinion.
Section 3780 of the Political Code provides that property
sold for delinquent taxes may be redeemed by the owner or
any party in interest; and section 3817. of the same code provides that such property may be redeemed by the owner,
his heirs, executors, administrators or other S1,tGcessors in
interest. If the reason given by the majority opinion for
prohibiting an owner from purchasing property at delinquent
tax sale is sound, then all other parties enumerated in the
last mentioned sections of the Political Code who are given
the right to. redeem should likewise be prohibited from purchasing such property at delinquent tax sale.
But aside from the untoward consequences which will flow
from the rule announced in the majority opinion, there are
cogent and persuasive reasons why it was not the intention of
the legislature by the enactment of sections 3834.20 to 3834.25
of the Political Code to preclude or prohibit an owner or person having an interest in real property from becoming a purchaser at delinquent tax sale of such property if he qualifies
as the highest bidder at such sale.
I can perceive of no reason founded Upon equity or justice
or any consideration of public policy as a basis for the conclusion that such owner or person interested should not be
permitted to become a purchaser of such property.
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It is a matter of common knowledge that at the time of
the enactment of the legislation in question many thousands
of parcels of real property in this state had been sold to the
state for delinquent taxes and had not been redeemed, and,
in my opinion, there is no basis for any other assumption than
that the reason for such tax delinquency was due almost entirely to the inability of property owners to pay their taxes
because of the period of great financial stringency which has
existed in this country since 1929. In other words, people
lost their property on account of tax delinquency because they
were financially unable to pay their taxes. This situation was
recognized by the legislature of this state in the various tax
moratorium statutes adopted between 1933 and 1939. It is
also a matter of common knowledge that as a result of the
great financial depression through which this country passed
between 1929 and 1939, real estate values greatly decreased,
and in my opinion it is a reasonable assumption that numerous
parcels of land in this state were assessed for the purposes of
taxation at the beginning of the depression at a value which
would produce a tax for an amount in excess of the deflated
value of that property during the period of the depression.
For this reason owners who became financially able refrained
from redeeming their property because to do so would require
them to pay to the various taxing entities more than the fair
market value of the property at the time of redemption;
hence, the property remained unredeemed and it could not
be sold under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of
the Political Code sections authorizing the board of supervisors with the approval of the tax collector and the state
controller to :fix a minimum price at which such property
could be sold less than the amount of delinquent taxes and
penalties against it. Hence, in order to get the title to the
property back into private ownership and restored to the
assessment rolls, the legislature enacted the statutes here under consideration.
Conceding that it was the purpose and object of the legislature in the enactment of these statutory provisions to reinstate such tax delinquent property on the assessment rolls of
the various taxing entities of the state, and that such provisions were not intended primarily for the relief of owners who
had lost their property because of their financial inability to
redeem it, I can nevertheless see no reason why an owner or
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person interested in such property should not be accorded the
same right as a stranger to bid at the delinquent tax sale of
such property and acquire the title thereto pursuant to the
statutory provisions above mentioned. In fact, I can see
many reasons why the owner should be permitted to bid for
the purchase of such property. He is obviously more familiar
with the property and should have a better idea of its value
and would be disposed to place a higher bid for the property
than a stranger. Obviously, the taxing entities would profit
in such event. Furthermore, since the taxing entities would
receive no more money from the sale of the property whether
it is purchased by the owner or a stranger to the title,considerations of public policy should favor the owner retaining
the title to his property even though the sale to him is comridered nothing more than a method of redeeming the property
from delinquent tax sale. Even if the legislature had provided that the owner would not be permitted to become a purchaser of the property at delinquent tax sale, in my opinion
there is grave doubt as to whether or not such provision
would not be in violation of the equal protection clause of the
14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
In other words, ~uch provision would discriminate against a
former owner of real property who should have the same
standing as any other member of the public as a ,purchaser
of the property from the state at delinquent tax sale.
The cases cited in the majority opinion commencing with
the case of Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal. 38 [85 Am. Dec. 94] ; to
Gates v. Lindley, 104 Cal. 451 [38 Pac. 311], are not in point,
as in none of these cases was the owner's right to bid for the
purchase of his property at delinquent tax sale questioned by
the officials administering the sale, and the title which the
owner acquired as the result of such purchase. was· not attacked by the taxing entity. These cases simply hold that
under well settled principles of equity jurisprudence a property owner cannot cut off junior lien claims against his property by permitting the taxes levied against it to become delinquent and then purchase the title from the taxing entity
at delinquent tax sale to the detriment of such junior lien
claimants. No question of this character is involved in the
case at bar. The sole question involved here is whether or not
when the legislature provided that the board of supervisors,
with the approval' of the tax collector and state controller
fixed the minimum amount at which tax delinquent property

could be sold by the state to the highest bidder, it thereby
intended to preclude the owner of the property at the time of
the delinquency from becoming a purchaser at such sale even
though he was the highest bidder for such property.
To my mind, it is improbable and contrary to human instincts and inclination to say that to permit an owner to become a purchaser at delinquent tax sale would tend to encourage tax delinquency because it would encourage owners
to let their taxes go delinquent with the intention and design
of purchasing the property at delinquent tax sale and evading
the payment of a portion of the tax burden which had accrued
against their property. In my opinion, no reasonably prudent person would run the risk of losing his property as the
result of such a procedure in order to avoid the. small saving
which might result therefrom; .My experience as a member of
the bar for more than twenty-five years and as attorney for
counties, cities and other taxing entities in dealing with 'problems of this character convinces me that there is no basis for an
argument of this character and it affords no sound reason for
the conclusion' reached in the majority opinion.
It seems much more reasonable and logical tome to conclude
that in fixing the minimum amount at which property sold to
the state for delinquent taxes could be purchased, the tax collector and board of supervisors would take into consideration
the fair market value of the property and fix such amount as
in their judgment a prospective purchaser would be justified
in paying therefor in view of the changed· conditions as to
market value since its sale to the state, and since the former
owner has nothing to say about the amount so fixed, and the
taxing entities are benefited because his bid is higher than all
others, it is impossible for me to see how it can be claimed that
the taxing entities are in any way injured or that it is not in
the public interest to permit the owner to become a purchaser
at such sale.
n can be appropriately stated that the situation here presented is "a condition not a theory," and that its solution
requires the application of nothing more than a little common
sense. If the legislature had intended to prohibit the owner
from bidding, it would have said so, and this court has no
authority to write anything into a statute which the legislature
has omitted therefrom. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1858.) Is it
not much more reasonable to assume that the legislature in-
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tended, by its failure to prohibit the owner from bidding, to
thereby afford him an opportunity to regain title to his property without being required to pay more than it is worth in
order to redeem it? I am forced so to conclude.
Respondent contends that to permit an owner to purchase
his property at delinquent tax sale for less than the full
amount required to redeem the property would constitute a
gift of public money, and an interpretation of section 3834.25
which would permit such owner to purchase his property at
delinquent tax sale would render said section unconstitutional
as being in violation of article IV, section 31 of the Constitution of California. Section 31 of article IV restricts the
legislature from making any gift or authorizing the making
of any gift of any public money or thing of yalue to any individual, etc., but the above mentioned section of the Political
Code does not make or authorize the making of a gift to the
owner of real property which has been sold to the state for
delinquent taxes by permitting him to become a purchaser at
the delinquent tax sale of said property. In the case at bar
the state has by foreclosure acquired title to Garvey's land.
The Political Code sections in question authorize the sale of
this land at a price not less than that fixed by the tax collector, approved by the board of supervisors and the state
controller. Any member of the public has the right to bid
for the purchase of this land at the delinquent tax sale thereof.
Garvey placed the highest bid ~or the land, which means that
the taxing entity received more for the land than if he had
not bid. Obviously, any member of the public had the right
to purchase this property if he placed a higher bid than that
submitted by Garvey. In either case the tax lien is extinguished by the sale of the property. It is presumed that the
highest bidder paid all that the property Was worth at the
time of the sale. Therefore, the state was not giving Garvey
anything by permitting him to bid more for the property than
any other member of the public was disposed to bid for it.
Under such circumstances it cannot be said by any stretch of
the imagination that the state gave Garvey anything or that
the state lost anything by permitting him to bid more for
the property than anyone else was disposed to bid.
Respondent also contends that a sale to a record owner for
less than the amount of delinquent taxes would constitute
nonuniform taxation in contravention of article XIII, section

o.
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1 of the California Constitution. The first 'sentence of said
section reads as follows:
" All property in the State except as otherwise in this Constitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the United
States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law, or as 'hereinafter provided."
While this section provides for uniformity of taxation and not
for uniformity in collection of taxes, it must be conceded that
if a statutory system of tax'ation were devised whereby all
property would be uniformly taxed in the first instance and
thereafter certain classes of property were favored in the
matter of tax collection resulting in substantial variation in
the amount collected, such system of taxation would violate
the above quoted constitutional provision. That, however,
is not the situation here. The property of no particular person or no particUlar class is singled out for different treatment, but all are subjected to precisely the same statutory
method of taxation and collection. That one person is enabled.in a particular instance to discharge his tax lien for less
than his neighbor does not change the situation~ The primary
obligation of real property tax'ation in this state is not upon,
the person but upon the property. Since 1933 there has been
no enforceable personal obligation for taxes against the owner
of real property. In that year section 3899 of the Political
Code was repealed and in the same year section 3771 was
amended so as to provide as follows:
"Provided, further, that no suit shall be brought against
the owner or person in possession of said property to recover
any taxes, assessments, penalties or costs if said property is
real property."
Thus, in applying the constitutional provisions above mentioned, we should disregard the person to whom the property
is assessed and consider only the property taxed. Considered
in that light, there is no difference between permitting the
record owner or possessor to purchase the property at tax
sale for less than' the amount of the tax lien and permitting
an entire stranger to do the same thing. In either event the
property bears the same tax burden. In either event the
taxation of property is equally either uniform or nonuniform.
Since it must be conceded that a stranger may purchase at
delinquent tax sale for less than the amount of extended
18 c. (2d)-lG
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taxes, there can be no violation of article XIII, section 1 of
the Constitution in permitting a record owner to do likewise.
For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinion that a per~
emptory writ of mandate should -issue requiring respondent
to execute and deliver to petitioner Garvey a deed conveying
the title of the property in question to him.
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Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied August
21, 1941. Houser, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

rived from the sale of shares, as against individual shareholders for whose protection the bond was given.
[4a,4b] ld.-Massachusetts Trusts-Bond of Trustee-Ownership
of Proceeds-Test of Ownership.-The ultimate ownership of
funds recovered in an action by shareholder-trustees suing on
a. bond of original trustees in a Massachusetts trust is not determined by the fact that in the pleadings and other documents
in the action no distinction between the two capacities of the
plaintiffs is noticed.

[L. A. Nos. 16969, 16970. In Bank.-July 24, 1941.]

[5] Banks-Deposits-Trusts in Deposits.-The question of ownership of funds on deposit in a bank is not determined by the
title to the account. That is significant only as it may give
rise to a disputable presumption where the facts remain undisclosed.

A. P. JENSEN et al., Respondents, v. HUGH EVANS &
COMP ANY (a Corporation) et al., Defendants; L. H.
BOOKER et al., Third Party Claimants and Appellants.
(Two Cases.)

[6] Levy and Seizure-Debtor's Title.-A judgment creditor can
acquire no greater right in the property levied on than the judgment debtor possesses at the time of the levy. If at that time
the debtor possesses no right whatsoever in the property, the
ereditor acquires none.
.

[1] New Trial-Proceedings in Which Authorized-Third Party

Claim Proceedings.-In a third party claim proceeding under
Code Civ. Proc., § 689, a new trial is not authorized, and a motion therefor is properly stricken.
[2] Trusts-Massachusetts. Trusts-Bond of Trustee-Ownership
of Proceeds.-The proceeds of a judgment recovered in an action against a surety company for misapplication by original
trustees of a Massachusetts trust of the trust funds belong to
the shareholders where the obligation of the bond ran, not to
the trust estate, but directly to the subscribers of shares in the
trust. This is true where in an action brought by certain
shareholders as representatives of the class of subscribers the
plaintiffs are afterwards appointed trustees of the trust and
undertake the prosecution in such capacity as well, and where
the purpose of such amendment is merely to protect the surety
company against future claims on behalf of the trust estate.
[3] ld.-Massachusetts Trusts-Bond of Trustee-Ownership of
Proceeds-Right of Judgment Creditors of Trusts.-Judgment
creditors of an insolvent Massachusetts trust who recover a
money judgment in lieu of a return of property in an action
for rescission of a contract for sUbscription of shares on the
ground of deceit and violation of the Corporate Securities Act,
are not entitled to the benefit of bonds of the trustees conditioned on honest application of funds of the trust estate deMcK. Dig. References: 1. New Trial, § 7; 2-4. Trusts, § 6; 5.
Banks, § 89; 6. Levy and Seizure, § 5.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
.Angeles County, from an order striking motions for new trial,
and from an order requiring the posting of a bond. Myron
Westover, Judge. Judgments reversed; appeals from orders
dismissed.
Third party claim proceedings involving a cont~st between
shareholder-trustees of two Massachusetts trusts and judgment creditors of the trusts in respect of two bank deposits
which consist of funds recovered in an action on the bond of
original trustees. Judgments for judgment creditors reversed. Appeals from certain orders dismissed.
Olson & Olson,.A1len Miller, Robert Clifton and Olson &
.A.hlport for Appellants.
Max Lewis, A. Arnold Klein, LaurenceM. Weinberg and
Loeb & Loeb for Respondents.
SHENK, J.-These actions have been consolidated for hearing on appeal. In each there are two appeals by separate
groups of third party claimants from a single judgment de5. See 4 Oal Jur.202.

